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This paper examines how diversely organized capitalist societies evolve by analyzing the 
transformation of Japan’s financial system since the 1990s. The banking, securities, and insurance, 
as well as the postal financial institutions changed significantly, but are hardly converging to 
Anglo-American or ‘liberal market’ models. We contend that Japan’s new financial system is best 
characterized as syncretic, with new, traditional and hybrid forms of practices, organizations and 
norms coexisting. Syncretism in industry was driven by a distinctive pattern of interest group 
politics we call syncretization.  Strong political leadership, facing serious electoral threats, shifted 
the policy logic from gradual incremental reforms following traditional interest group dynamics, to 
rapid reforms that excluded the traditionally powerful interest groups most affected by these 
reforms. We support the notion that diverse industry outcomes can be complementary to broader 
political economy reforms that take Japan away from its traditional model, part of a broader 
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The question of how capitalist societies, diversely organized, evolve in an age of ever-
increasing internationalization has been a longstanding area of scholarly inquiry.1 Mechanisms of 
institutional change in particular have been a recent focus, as political scientists and sociologists 
move beyond simple models of exogenous, shock-precipitated change to examine a variety of 
gradual transformations and patterns of change.2 One core element of how each political economy 
is organized, and consequently a key driver of how each changes, has been the financial system, 
from which other aspects such as corporate governance and employment patterns stem.3
Yamamura and Streeck, 2003
 To 
examine processes of institutional change more closely, we analyze the financial system of Japan, a 
country traditionally situated at one extreme in almost all typologies of how diverse capitalist 
systems are organized; Japan, along with Germany, has long been considered the polar opposite of 
Anglo-American, market-centered models of capitalism, described variously as a non-liberal 
( ) or coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001), with a 
bank-centered financial system with heavy state intervention to shape the economy (Zysman, 1983).  
An examination of extremes—Japan in this case—often reveals processes of change most 
clearly. Japan’s financial system is a valuable object of inquiry since it has greatly transformed over 
the past couple decades, in part by incorporating many aspects of Anglo-American financial 
systems, but convergence does not seem likely any time soon.  Instead, Japan has crafted a more 
diversified financial system that has retained some of the features of a non-liberal system, adopted 
some features of an Anglo-American system, and also created some new practices that are distinct 
from any pre-existing systems. This non-convergence, in a form we term syncretism, has actually 
shielded Japan’s financial system from the 2008 global financial crisis that severely damaged 
financial sectors worldwide.4 Therefore, understanding how Japan’s financial system is now 
configured, and uncovering the mechanisms of how it transformed, provide useful insights into the 
fast-growing scholarship exploring processes of institutional change.  
3 
 
1.1 Syncretism: The Observed Outcome in Japan’s Financial System 
Japan’s traditional post-war financial system during much of the postwar era had two major 
components. The banking system took deposits from households and firms, and used these funds to 
provide loans to industry. Investment areas were shaped heavily by the government through a 
variety of policy tools, led by elite officials at the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Bank of Japan 
(BOJ). The other component, the postal saving system, took household deposits and invested in 
infrastructure projects, chosen by politicians, to serve the latter’s political bases to win local votes. 
This postwar Japanese financial system was closed to new entrants and carefully segmented into 
subcategories such as banking, insurance, and securities industries, each with strictly limited 
business models. Individual asset investment opportunities were essentially limited to domestic 
deposit-taking institutions, and kept within the country.  
Since the 1980s, Japan’s financial system has undergone an extensive transformation, 
becoming far more open and diverse. By the late 2000s, bond and equity markets were highly 
developed, and a variety of new entrants, both domestic and foreign, brought a wide range of new 
business models. The banking system played a smaller role in the economy, foreign insurers and 
securities firms became major players, and the postal saving system became corporatized, en route 
to full privatization and competition in the same markets as private sector firms. The overall 
complexity rose considerably, a trend shared worldwide. It has been pointed out that labeling these 
new, more heterogeneous forms of financial systems everywhere has become exceedingly difficult 
(Deeg, 2010).  
We contend that Japan’s new financial system is best characterized as syncretic, in which 
new, old, and hybrid forms of practices, norms, and modes of organization coexist.5 The old have 
not been simply replaced by the new, nor entirely morphed into hybrid forms. While the breadth of 
the new has expanded, and hybridization is occurring to a significant degree, large portions of very 
traditional organizations, norms, and practices remain within the industry. Syncretism, therefore, is 
a specific form of diversity.6  
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The “new” are best represented by foreign investment banks, securities firms, insurers, and 
some new Japanese entrants. They introduced new business models (such as derivatives and 
annuities), practices (particularly regarding employment and inter-firm relations), and norms (their 
perceived raison d'etre to maximize profit, and especially for many foreign firms, maximize short-
term shareholder returns).  
The “hybrid,” which melds traditional and new elements, are best represented by the three 
major financial groups, Mizuho, Mitsubishi UFJ, and Mitsui Sumitomo, centered around their 
respective mega-banks. The mega-banks were created by mergers between historical main banks, 
and the financial groups, organized as holding companies, were allowed to expand into previously 
restricted areas such as securities, trust banking, and insurance. The financial groups embrace a 
combination of new and old business models (ranging from traditional deposits to foreign currency 
denominated accounts and a variety of annuities and insurance products), multiple forms of 
employment practices (traditional seniority-based banks versus performance oriented securities 
subsidiaries, for example), as well as new and old inter-firm relations (acting as relational “main 
banks,” but also entering into joint ventures and tie-ups with foreign financial institutions). 
The “old” are exemplified by regional banks, which overwhelmingly retain traditional 
strategies (continued heavy reliance on retail banking), organizational structures (main bank 
relationships, seniority based hierarchies) and norms (regionally based with close ties to local 
governments, emphasis on relationship banking as a key source of client information). 
The postal system has also become a combination of the new, old, and hybrid. The corporate 
form is new, with the corporatized Japan Post Holding Company fully owning the bank, insurance, 
and postal services as subsidiary companies. Top management was given to private sector 
businessmen, with a new concern for profitability, and employees—including postmasters—are no 
longer public servants. The postal companies also offer new products and services, such as mutual 
funds and credit cards, with tie-ups to foreign firms’ insurance and annuity products. At the same 
time, Japan Post Bank is a hybrid in that the government currently still owns 100% of the shares of 
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the parent holding company, with plans for the government to retain one third of the shares.  This 
hybrid ownership form, where the organization is that of a corporatized holding company but the 
controlling shares belong to the state, has led to calls of unfair competition from Japan Post’s 
private sector and foreign competitors.  However, the core business remains traditional: the Japan 
Post Bank takes retail deposits through its nationwide network, and it is a significant buyer of 
Japanese government bonds—about one third of the 700 trillion yen Japanese Government Bond 
(JGB) market.  
In Japan’s new financial system, the new, old, and hybrid coexist. Table 1 shows the 
roughly similar deposits amounts in each area. Note that the total amount of deposits in Japan’s 
sixty-odd regional banks even slightly exceeded those of city banks (including mega-banks and 
some others) by 2010. And the Japan Post Bank, as a single financial institution, still dwarfs the 
mega-banks. (See Table 2)  
[insert Table 1 here] 
[insert Table 2 here] 
1.2 Syncretization: The Pattern and Process of Change 
The core question posed by this paper is: how and why did this observed syncretism in 
Japan’s financial sectors occur?  
The diversification of financial sectors into new, traditional, and hybrid components is not 
entirely an expected outcome given the most common expressions of the idea of institutional 
complementarity.  In the influential thrust of scholarship on comparative capitalisms,7 institutions 
are considered complementary, or having a good “fit” with one another when the presence of one 
enhances the function of another, and so on, creating a matrix of interlocking institutions.8 
Piecemeal change should therefore be difficult, and it may be expected to lower overall 
performance.9 It also raises the question of whether the observation of syncretism in Japan is simply 
transitory—is it an interlude before the set of institutions converge to a new set of 
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complementarities (closer to an Anglo-American model, for example), or will they revert back to a 
more traditional Japanese mode.  
Our observation of syncretic outcomes also raises the issue of the process of change. A 
prominent thrust of scholarship is aimed at understanding gradual but transformative change that 
arises endogenously rather than from exogenous shocks. Pierson (Pierson, 2003) brings attention to 
time horizons in the causes and outcomes of change, and Streeck and Thelen (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005) articulate several patterns of gradual institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen (Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010) go on to stipulate the political conditions, in terms of veto possibilities and 
characteristics of the target institutions, for each pattern of change to occur. The question for this 
study is therefore: was syncretism in Japan’s financial sectors a case of gradual transformative 
change, and if so, does it follow previously identified patterns? 
The main contentions of this paper are as follows. The pattern of change entailed a period of 
gradual adjustment, with incremental regulatory reforms driving marginal changes in industry 
dynamics, followed by a burst of regulatory reform that significantly reshaped the actors, business 
strategies, and patterns of interaction to create the observed syncretic outcome. Particularly in the 
case of Japn Post, the burst of reforms was followed by partial retrenchment of those reforms over a 
longer period.  
The driver of change was political—a particular pattern of interest group politics we call 
syncretization. The prolonged gradual adjustment period was driven by traditional interest group 
politics. At the junctures of rapid change, however, major political thrusts for reform were driven 
by acute electoral concerns over the party’s survival in power. Traditional political bargains and 
historical industry-level policy processes were discarded by the political leadership calling for 
reform as a platform for survival.  
The key point is that the actors pushing for reform were not the incumbent, traditionally 
powerful interest groups most affected by reform. The impetus for reform came, instead, from 
strong political leadership spearheading reform as a critical electoral strategy for the party’s 
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survival. Since the incumbent major players in the financial system were not pushing for reforms, 
only some financial players immediately rushed to embrace the new possibilities they enabled. 
Hence, the coexistence of old, new, and hybrid elements. Moreover, particularly for postal reforms, 
since the interests pushing reforms were not of those being reformed, once the political leadership 
lost its strong drive for reform, the process slowed, and even reversed in some cases.  
1.3 Implications for Understanding Institutional Change 
In order to theorize about institutional change, Campbell (Campbell, 2004) reminds us to 
carefully specify the institutions we examine. Regarding the conceptualization of institutions 
themselves, while various notions of institutions have developed over the past few decades, we 
settle with an increasingly widespread middle-of-the-road conception: 1) they include formal and 
informal “rules of the game,” which can include external structures and cognitive frames, and 2) 
they include not only the rules of the game, but also how those rules are concretely played out 
(Djelic, 2010, p. 33).  
 
In the financial sector, the main rules of the game include: the formal legal regulatory 
framework as ultimately determined by politicians, bureaucratic discretion to interpret and enforce 
the regulatory framework, and firm strategies about how to operate—both in markets and in 
political strategies to influence policy. Norms play a significant role in determining what firms are 
maximizing (e.g., shareholder returns versus longevity as a corporate entity), and how they pursue 
strategies in the face of uncertainty (e.g. business models, and how and when to lobby the 
government for what), particularly when governance structures provide leeway for interpretive 
ambiguity (such as shareholders not actively demanding immediate maximum returns).  
This paper finds that the “rules of the game” in Japan’s financial sectors shifted in the 
following manner: in the private sector financial system, formal regulatory frameworks shifted 
gradually since the late 1970s, guided by bureaucratic leadership in the context of global financial 
market liberalization. Then, in the mid-1990s, a major thrust of political leadership-driven reform 
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significantly accelerated liberalization while restructuring bureaucratic financial oversight. The 
leadership’s reform focus, in turn, was driven by a normative political institutional change; for the 
first time since the LDP took power in 1955, it was electorally vulnerable: expectations shared by 
voters and the LDP of the LDP’s continued rule no longer held, with electoral defeat a real 
possibility. 
The new financial regulatory framework enabled new entrants, who brought new business 
models and norms into the sector, altering the dynamics of competition in many areas, shaping the 
new and hybrid areas. In the postal system, a far stronger, electorally motivated, politically led 
reform drive spearheaded legislation to corporatize and privatize the entire postal system. However, 
political backlash against efforts to disrupt long-practiced forms of redistributive politics gradually 
eroded the initial reform plans, ending in a revised Postal Privatization Law under the new political 
leadership in April 2012.  
So where does this lead us with respect to theoretical discussions of institutional change and 
complementarity? First, this paper empirically supports calls by more theoretical work to re-
introduce the notion of power struggles in shaping change or sustaining existing arrangements, and 
to avoid overly functional analysis that infer from the current function of institutions their purpose 
(Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Thelen, 2010). In doing so, this study brings attention to the role of 
political struggles in shifting the mode and speeds of change—from a mode of gradual incremental 
change following a longstanding set of interest group politics, to another mode of rapid reform 
driven by electoral concerns and a different set of policy dynamics, and then, to a degree, back to 
the initial mode of incremental change.  
This paper’s findings most closely support the theory of institutions and institutional change 
put forth by theoretical economist Aoki’s most recent, highly sophisticated conceptual approach 
(Aoki 2010). He offers an alternative approach to institutions and institutional complementarity, 
which rejects the notion that institutional complementary necessarily constrains partial change, or 
that partial change causes extremely low performance.  
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Aoki provides a complex, game theory-centered, but far more holistic conception of 
institutions, complementarity and change. Aoki builds upon a concept of associational cognition to 
construct frameworks of the organizational architecture of firms, and how they fit within broader 
societal rules, which are themselves shared cognitive frames. In this conception, institutional 
complementarities occur as one of multiple possible strategic equilibria resulting from interactions 
by agents across domains. He shows how this implies that changes in quasi-parameters can shift the 
marginal payoffs among agents, which can then lead to conflicting strategic responses due to policy 
changes or the endogenous accumulation of physical or cognitive assets, which can cause 
conflicting strategic responses in complementary domains. (Aoki, 2010: 136). Applying this to the 
Japanese context, Aoki posits that “the emerging diversity in the corporate domain and the gradual 
demise of the bureaucracy-mediated state in the political exchange domain are mutually 
complementary and reinforcing of each other.” (Aoki, 2010: 167). In other words, the shift towards 
a more diverse industry structure is actually complementary with Japan’s postwar political 
economic system moving away from a policy model strongly mediated by the bureaucracy. We 
apply his framework more fully in the conclusion after elaborating on our findings.  
The remainder of this paper examines the transformation of the private sector financial 
system, followed by postal system reforms. The conclusion will suggest implications and take an 
initial stance on how far the pattern of syncretism, driven by the politics of syncretization, might 
apply beyond Japan, and beyond finance.  
2. The Private Sector Financial System 
 
 In the private sector financial system, MOF carefully managed a gradual liberalization of 
Japan’s postwar bank-centered, government directed financial system since the late 1970s, as 
finance liberalized globally. Traditional interest group political patterns consisted of bureaucracy-
mediated compromises pushed by intense lobbying from large Japanese financial institutions.  
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In the mid-1990s, however, Prime Minister Hashimoto’s Cabinet promulgated the financial 
“Big Bang” reforms, driven by electoral concerns since the LDP faced unprecedented vulnerability; 
shared expectations of LDP’s continuing electoral victories no longer held, an institutional change 
in the realm of norms (Toya, 2006). The reforms drastically accelerated liberalization by 
reorganizing the regulatory framework, breaking down sectoral compartments, enabling new 
entrants, and providing a wide range of new options for corporate organization and business 
strategies. The MOF itself was broken apart, and its vast discretionary authority sharply curtailed, 
precipitating normative shifts surrounding firms’ market and political strategies as a rule-based 
regulatory model took hold. New entrants also brought new norms, organizations, and business 
strategies, altering the very dynamics of competition – what firms competed over—in the sector.  
These reforms departed from historical interest group political patterns. Nor did they result 
from political pressure from foreign firms – the largest beneficiaries of reform. Instead, the reforms 
were spearheaded by the political leadership despite intense industry opposition. Since the interest 
groups most affected (large incumbent Japanese financial institutions) were not driving the reforms, 
unlike in the US and UK, incumbent firms did not rush to embrace new business models and 
organizations.  As a result, Japan’s financial sectors did not converge to those of the US or UK, 
leaving a different configuration of strategies and firms. An unexpected benefit was Japan’s 
financial system emerging largely unscathed from the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The 
primary cost was in the large inefficiencies of assets held by mega banks and regional banks not 
being put to productive use. In the political realm, since the financial reforms did not result from 
financial interest group politics, such as in the case of the US, political pressures for further reform 
were not particularly strong.  
2.1 The Traditional “Japanese Model” of Financial Sectors and Gradual Reform 
Japan’s traditional financial model, commonly labeled “bank-centered,” relied on a high 
domestic household savings rate and tightly restricted household investment opportunities. Banks 
and the postal system were primary repositories for capital, and MOF channeled investments into 
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strategic sectors such as heavy industries and manufacturing. Without including the postal saving 
system, banks were the largest actors, followed by life insurance firms.10
The traditional industry model dominated by MOF, provided very little leeway for diversity 
in organization, strategy, or norms about market competition or political strategies. Through formal 
and informal rules, MOF compartmentalized the sector into segments such as banking, insurance, 
and securities, and sub-segments such as city and regional banks. MOF restricted market entry and 
tightly managed business models through discretionary licensing. In exchange for this control and 
compliance with the government’s investment objectives, MOF provided implicit guarantees of 
financial institution rescue, usually through government-orchestrated mergers—part of shared 
norms between regulators and the regulated.
  
11
The traditional policy model entailed dense informal bargaining and coordination between 
industry actors, MOF, and LDP politicians, usually those specializing in financial affairs (known as 
“zoku” politicians).
 The result was a remarkable homogeneity in 
products and services across firms, which led to policy strategies of cultivating interpersonal 
relationships with MOF officials; “MOF-tan” were employees whose sole mission was to court, 
wine and dine MOF officials to obtain information and curry favor. 
12
Gradual reforms began in the late 1970s, carefully managed by MOF (
 The industry associations for banks and life insurers were powerful political 




gradually de-compartmentalized the sectors and incrementally deregulated business models 
restrictions such as brokerage fees ( ), carefully maintaining balance between each 
segment, such as matching new privileges in securities (such as trading in the secondary market for 
certificates of deposits), with banks (such as participation in bond futures markets)  (Rosenbluth, 
1989, p. 155).  
Put into Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) typology of institutional change, the MOF-orchestrated 
gradual liberalization can be considered a process of “conversion,” in which old institutions are 
deployed to new ends. The regulatory framework including compartmentalization and licensing, 
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originally established to effectively channel investment towards strategic ends, was used to 
incrementally liberalize the sector.  
2.2 The Financial “Big Bang” Reforms 
 The Financial Big Bang reforms, initially announced in 1996, rapidly accelerated the 
sector’s liberalization, taking matters beyond MOF’s control. The plan, a 1000 page omnibus bill, 
revised 24 financial and tax laws. Passed in March 1998, it took effect that December, and was 
implemented in multiple phases through 2001.  
 The reforms covered the areas within MOF’s domain--banking, securities, insurance, 
accounting, and foreign exchange–but not the postal savings system (Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT)’s jurisdiction) or pension funds (Ministry of Health and Welfare’s 
jurisdiction). The three parts included: 1) measures to enhance competition and reduce government 
control, such as deregulation of international capital transactions and products such as securities, 
de-compartmentalization between the segments, and removing the ban (since 1945) on financial 
holding companies; 2) market development and transparency enhancements such as international 
accounting standards, stricter disclosure rules, and safety net creation; and 3) restructuring 
regulation by splitting apart MOF with a new Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) supervising 
banking, securities, and insurance sectors, and a revision of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) Law to 
drastically increase its independence from MOF.14
2.3 The Politics Driving the “Big Bang” Reforms: Syncretization 
  
The Big Bang financial reforms were spearheaded by political leadership within the LDP, as 
the party faced unprecedented electoral vulnerability. As the LDP sought broad public approval,  
MOF lost control of the reform agenda and financial industry interest groups, with the most to lose, 
were largely excluded from the process (Toya, 2006). In short, the industry most affected by the 
reforms did not have a significant voice in the reform process.  
This contrasted Great Britain’s financial “big bang” reforms of the 1980s, in which the 
cartel of British brokerages lobbied for deregulation to compete against US firms, recognizing that 
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failure to do so would obliterate their global competitive presence (Laurence, 2001). Japan’s 
financial markets were experiencing a similar “hollowing out” by the mid-1990s, but domestic 
financial firms were not lobbying for liberalization; Japan’s “big bang” was not the result of 
domestic corporate lobbying.  
The politics of Japan’s Big Bang reforms differed considerably between the first phase, 
promulgation of the reform initiative in 1996, and the second phase, the detailed reform plan of 
1997 and implementation.  
In the first, phase, corporate interest groups were almost entirely absent. The LDP at the 
time faced unprecedented vulnerability, having lost power in 1993 and returning in 1994 with 
coalition partners the New Party Sakigake and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the LDP’s 
traditional opposition. Facing widely criticized public fund injections to bail out housing loan 
cooperatives (known as jusen), and an ever-lower stock market price and prolonged economic 
slump, the LDP latched onto reform in the run-up to the Lower House elections called for October 
1996. As background, the electoral system change enacted in 1994 shifted electoral salience 
towards broad appeal rather than traditional local compensation,15
Hashimoto’s reform initiative announced before the election bypassed standard LDP 
legislative processes. Instead of going through LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) 
populated by industry sympathizer financial zoku politicians, reformers, notably Mizuno Kiyoshi 
and Shiozaki Yasuhisa, had drafted a plan more comprehensive than the Big Bang reforms 
themselves, as part of the Administration Reform Promotion Headquarters set up by Prime 
Minister Hashimoto. Although the LDP’s financial zoku opposed, a meeting of LDP top officials 
in mid-September 1996 decided to pursue electorally popular reform measures (including the 
breakup of MOF) at the expense of their hitherto powerful financial industry constituents (
 further making a reform agenda 
politically attractive.  
Toya, 
2006, pp. 165-166). The LDP was also catering to the strong demands of its coalition partners, 
Sakigake and JSP, who wanted to avoid being blamed for taxpayer costs incurred by being 
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coalition partners with the LDP in its reform efforts. They insisted that the MOF, who had been 
preparing for a more modest reorganization of its financial supervisory functions, be split apart—
and the LDP agreed (Hiwatari, 2000).  
At the time, the financial industry was weakened by multiple crises and scandals, and 
MOF, which had worked to protect the industry, was under serious attack. A wave of credit 
cooperatives bankruptcies and regional bank failures in 1994 were followed in 1995 by the seven 
jusen housing loan companies facing insolvency. Many of these firms had retired MOF officials 
in upper management and received special regulatory treatments.16
Toya, 2006, p. 161
 Their losses amounted to 6.4 
trillion yen, and a public bailout of 685 billion yen was incredibly unpopular – a 1996 poll by the 
Asahi Shimbun reported 87% of the public opposed ( ). Large financial 
institutions were unwilling to shoulder the bailout as MOF initially hoped, fueling MOF 
unpopularity and voices of concern from the LDP’s coalition partners as well (Hiwatari, 2000). 
Other scandals, such as Daiwa Bank’s losses from illegal bond trading in New York, leading to 
US government publically criticizing MOF for not acting on prior knowledge, further weakened 
MOF. A “Japan Premium” developed, in which international financial institutions charged interest 
premiums on all transactions with Japanese banks in the inter-bank call market due to the lack of 
trust in MOF’s supervision and Japanese financial institutions’ financial wellbeing. Between 1994 
and 1996, wining and dining scandals with Japanese financial firms lavishly entertaining MOF 
officials made headlines, leading to an unprecedented dismissal of MOF’s two most senior 
officials (Toya, 2006). The life insurance sector was also declining, partly due to the post-bubble 
economic slump, with the number of life insurance subscribers peaking in 1994. Many were in a 
financially vulnerable position, stuck with investment portfolios that yielded less than their 
“guaranteed return rates” promised to subscribers, due to the restricted investment targets and the 
low interest rate adopted by the government attempting to stimulate the economy (Mitsuno, 2006). 
In short, domestic and international public opinion of Japan’s financial institutions and MOF hit 
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all-time lows, just when the LDP was most sensitive to broader public opinion and vulnerable to 
the demands of coalition partners.  
In the second phase, Hashimoto, bolstered by an electoral victory for the LDP, 
immediately moved to enact his reform agenda. Finance was central to his broader “Six Major 
Reforms” and Hashimoto wanted to push through reforms from the cabinet level rather than 
through PARC committees with zoku politicians. The LDP was not interested in consulting the 
broader industry at this juncture (Toya, 2006). 
MOF promptly supplied its reform plan, already having lost the battle over its breakup. 
Interested in preserving what public favor it could, it bypassed the standard industry consultations 
to avoid accusations of being too close to industry. MOF therefore worked to enlist the support of 
the mass media, trading companies, and manufacturing firms. A top official is quoted as saying:  
 “Had we consulted the industries, they would have opposed us. We knew that public 
opinion would be on our side… It was obvious that deregulated businesses would be in trouble. 
Thus we could not consult those industries that would have faced trouble due to deregulation.” 
(Sakakibara and Tahara, 1999, pp. 135-136).17
 The financial industry was further weakened in 1997 with a series of racketeering scandals 




 reducing the 
industry’s clout in narrowing the breadth and slowing down the reforms. Thus, large financial 
firms with the most to lose from the reforms succeeded only in slowing down the implementation 
of cross-entry into different segments by somewhat credibly pointing to the possibility of a wave 
of bankruptcies. Securities firms lobbied for a “soft landing,” with complete brokerage 
commission liberalization in 1998, and bank subsidiaries waiting until 1999 to enter the securities 
businesses. The insurance industry, aided by incumbent foreign insurers who mobilized US 
diplomatic pressure, successfully lobbied to delay bank entry into insurance until 2001, and even 
then, limiting bank participation initially ( ). The insurance industry association was 
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faced with a preoccupation on how to rescue and resuscitate a string of mid-sized life insurers that 
had failed, and was not in a strong bargaining position (Kushida, 2010).  
Significantly, those with the most to gain – foreign financial institutions – were not 
strongly lobbying for the Big Bang reforms. Foreign diplomatic pressure mobilized by financial 
firms peaked in the mid to late 1980s over the issue of market entry. Once inside, however, they 
did not organize into strong political associations, since their positions did not necessarily align on 
several key issues; some with longstanding ties to the Japanese government preferred to remain 
independent, while others were leery of political involvement (Pauly, 1987). Moreover, foreign 
firm industry associations within Japan, separated from major Japanese industry associations until 
after the Big Bang, were seldom organized to exert political pressure. For example, the Foreign 
Banking Association established in 1984 revolved around European banks, represented only about 
40% foreign banks, and was primarily an information exchange association rather than lobbying 
organization.  
For many foreign firms, significant investments into Japan’s existing industry 
arrangements deterred them from liberalization or new entry. For example, joining the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, opened to foreign members in 1986, cost up to a billion yen (including indirect 
costs). The 22 foreign firms that had joined by 1988 were, unsurprisingly, silent on the issue of 
liberalizing commission fees that would have nullified the benefits of their exclusive membership 
(Laurence, 2001, p. 131). This was understandable, since, historically, liberalization of privileged 
foreign market segments, such as dollar denominated “impact loans” had rapidly dried up in the 
face of competition from new entrants, both foreign and domestic (Pauly, 1987).  
In short, the policy process for the Financial Big Bang reforms departed considerably from 
the ongoing gradual reform process orchestrated by MOF. Driven by electoral considerations, in 
the context of Japan’s political logic, and prevailing circumstances weakening traditionally 
powerful interest groups, the political leadership drove a strong reform agenda.19 The nature of 
the reforms led to syncretism in market outcomes.  
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2.4 Market Outcomes of the Financial “Big Bang”: Syncretism 
 The financial Big Bang reforms transformed the logic of competition in Japan’s financial 
industry in a syncretic form. Foreign firms and new entrants took advantage of new opportunities to 
offer services and products, becoming highly profitable. Incumbent Japanese firms were 
disadvantaged, since their organizations and strategies were optimized for previous regulatory 
conditions of limited products and services. While free to enter new business areas, their existing 
workforces lacked the necessary expertise, and radical workforce reductions were legally difficult 
and normatively prohibitive. After years of adjustment, many incumbents adopted hybrid structures, 
with holding companies, multiple employment structures, and diverse market strategies. Regional 
banks, with neither the resources nor the will to transform thoroughly, overwhelmingly adhered to 
traditional structures and strategies (Shimizu, 2009).  
2.4.1 The New: New Actors, New Strategies, New Products and Services 
 The new areas of finance that the Big Bang reforms introduced entailed truly dramatic 
changes. Foreign firms, previously confined to relatively niche segments, became major players in 
almost all areas of Japanese finance. In the securities industry they became highly profitable, 
pioneering Wall Street-type employment with high salaries and bonuses, little job security, and 
fluid labor mobility among firms for mid-career professionals.20 As the business transitioned away 
from a reliance on commission fees for basic trading—trading commission dropped 70% from 
1994, and 20% between 1999 and 200121
In insurance, firms such as Aflac and Metlife Alico took prominent market shares, with 
several appearing in the top fifteen since 2000. And in banking, foreign investment funds turned 
—foreign firms enjoyed advantages in offering complex 
products and services such as derivatives and convertible bonds, utilizing superior information 
technology infrastructure to execute fast and complex trades, research analyst services that Japanese 
brokerages had not, and better access to global markets. The main advantage of domestic firms, in 
particular Nomura Securities, was their long-standing ties to major Japanese corporate clients for 
trading, bond issuing, and other financial market activities. 
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around and thoroughly restructured several banks, most notably Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank, the 
seventh and eighth largest banks in Japan (though far smaller than the four mega-banks and the 
postal bank), along with regional banks Tokyo Star Bank and Kansai Sawayaka Bank.22
New Japanese entrants also became highly successful. By 2012, retail bank Seven Bank, 
owned by retailing giant Seven and i Holdings, had become a prominent player with ATMs in 
ubiquitous Seven Eleven convenience stores. In insurance, Sony Life and Sony Sonpo casualty 
insurance became eighth and tenth in terms of policy sales income. In securities, electronic trading 
company Rakuten Securities, a subsidiary of Japanese online commercial giant Rakuten, ranked 
among the top twenty (at 19) in operating income (
  
TDB, 2012).  
The performance gap between domestic and foreign firms was particularly stark in 
securities. In 1996, the Japan Securities Dealers’ Association’s Japanese members’ operating profits 
dropped 40% from the previous year while that of foreign securities firms grew an incredible 21 
fold (TDB, 1998, p. 370). The breadth of foreign activity increased dramatically after the Big Bang 
reform. After 1998, Japan’s financial Big Bang reforms enabled foreign trust banks to offer dollar-
denominated overseas investment trusts. Combined with Japan’s low interest rates and banking 
crisis, this led to an inflow of Japanese savings; between 1998 and 1999, despite overall shrinkage 
of Japanese corporate pension funds entrusted to major Japanese trust banks, the nine foreign trust 
banks recorded a 30% combined increase in corporate pension fund assets (Sato, 1999). In the first 
half of fiscal 1998, the total assets held by foreign trusts increased by approximately 40% (TDB, 
1999, p. 31). A particularly successful dollar-denominated investment trust developed by LTCB 
Warburg took in 50 billion yen in its first week (1998).  By late 2004, a survey showed that foreign 
institutions took 26.5% of all shares of funds managed by investment trusts, investment advisers, 
and pension funds, totaling 147 trillion yen, an increase of 80% since 1997.23
TDB, 2002, p. 22
 In 2000, the total 
operating income for the 238 domestic securities firms dropped 23%, reflecting a 45% drop in 
commission revenues, while that of the 50 foreign firms rose 33%, with revenue increasing by 44% 
( ).  
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2.4.2 The Hybrid 
 A range of interesting hybrid organizational forms became apparent as new firms, business 
models, and organizations appeared after the Big Bang reforms. Most prominently, multiple 
employment systems emerged within single firms.  
 A prime example is Shinsei Bank, the former Long Term Credit Bank that became 
insolvent in 1998, was rescued and reformed by US investment fund Ripplewood, and began 
operations in June 2000. Most interestingly, it implemented a two-tiered compensation scheme. 
“Permanent staff” enjoyed higher job security but lower pay, while “market staff,” mostly mid-
career hires and foreigners, received higher pay in return for lower job security (Vogel, 2006, pp. 
182-183).24
For many of the major Japanese financial institutions, burdened with large numbers of 
employees and constrained from shedding them quickly due to long term employment obligations, 
their solution to offer new products was to partner with foreign firms. In a sense, they created 
financial “supply chains” by selling products created by foreign firms through their own sales 
networks. Japanese banks, trust banks, insurers, and even securities firms were among those that 
sought partnerships with foreign firms in the mid-2000s. For example, Sumitomo Bank and Daiichi 
Kangyo Bank created tie-ups with Templeton and JP Morgan, respectively. Sumitomo Trust Bank 
partnered with Chase Manhattan. Japan’s largest life insurer, Japan Life, entered into a tie-up with 
Deutchebank, Yasuda Life with PaineWebber, and Yasuda Fire and Marine with Signa 
International. New joint ventures were created as well, including Prudential-Mitsui Trust 
Investments, Nomura BlackRock Asset Management, Meiji Dresdner Asset Management, and 
others (
 Firms such as Mizuho Securities and PWC Japan have also implemented two-tiered 
employment schemes that allow employees to choose whether to take longer-term employment at 
lower upfront pay, or high upfront pay with less employment security.  
Kushida, 2010).  
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2.4.3 The Traditional  
In contrast to the vast changes of the new and hybrid, regional banks by and large retained 
their traditional organizations, strategies, and normative underpinnings.  Japan’s 64 regional banks 
located nationwide originated from post-war government efforts to finance and rebuild regional 
economies.  Their primary profits are from retail banking, catering to local small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).  The SMEs, their customers, are politically salient largely due to their numbers; 
over 95 percent of firms in Japan are SMEs, comprising nearly 70 percent of the labor market.25
The preferential financing available for SMEs also protects regional banks via credit 
guarantees.   By lowering the risk associated with loans given to SMEs, credit guarantees allow 
regional banks to distribute loans to financially weak SMEs. These publicly funded credit 
guarantees also provide post-retirement positions for local officials.  So long as credit guarantees 
exist, zombie SMEs will survive, ensuring the survival of regional banks. The lack of middle-risk 




The strength of regional banks’ “relationship banking” strategies also sustains their 
continued survival in traditional form. Regional banks nurture close relationships with their SME 
customers over a long period of time, averaging well over 10 years for larger SMEs,26
A third factor supporting regional banks in their traditional form is the practice of each 
prefecture having at least one regional bank as the designated financial institution of the local 
government.  These designated financial institutions maintain the financial stability of local public 
institutions, including prefectural and municipal governments.  Their roles include handling fiscal 
 giving them 
detailed, long-term information about their customers.  Interviews with regional bank officers 
reveal that bankers see their SME customers at least once a week for banking purposes, but often 
have more frequent contact in various settings within the community. On-site visits by bankers to 
SMEs are not only to enhance relations to increase business, but also to get a better sense of their 
business performance.   
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cash management, managing payroll accounts of public officials, and financing local governments 
and their projects.  These transactions, until recently without fees, are increasingly a financial 
burden for regional banks, but at the same time, provide precious information about regional 
economic health. In particular, as administrator of local tax collection for local citizens and 
especially businesses (taxpayers are required to make payments through their local governments’ 
designated financial institution), they receive valuable information on the performance of individual 
local businesses, giving them an advantage in the SME loan market.   
3. The Postal Savings System 
Japan’s postal system was reformed through a politically spearheaded drive of privatizing 
the entire system to bring it into competition with the rest of Japan’s financial sector. Japan’s postal 
savings system is thought to be the world’s largest holder of personal savings; at its peak it held 224 
trillion yen (2.1 trillion dollars) of household assets in its savings accounts (yu-cho) and an 
additional 126 trillion yen (1.2 trillion dollars) of household assets in its life insurance services 
(kampo).  Together, its assets accounted for nearly a third of Japan’s household assets.  With these 
funds, the postal savings system and the postal insurance system served as key contributors to the 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP).27
Iwamoto, 2002
  During the post-war years, FILP was the source of 
government investment in industrial development, small and medium enterprises, public works, and 
other government funded projects which in turn provided politicians the ability to influence votes 
with public funds ( ; Amyx et al., 2005).  Japan’s reformers saw postal privatization 
as a necessary part of Japan’s overall financial reform and liberalization, since postal savings and 
insurance, via FILP, placed nearly one third of household savings under government control.28
FILP played a key role in the post-war building of Japan by financing the construction of 
national highways and airports, providing funds for housing construction, subsidizing social welfare 
facilities, and other public works projects.  However, as infrastructure saturated nearly all corners of 
Japan, the supply of funds began to exceed demand, creating abundant room for inefficient and 
more clientelistic spending.  Doi and Hoshi (
  
Doi and Hoshi, 2003) estimate that in 2001, of the 350 
22 
 
trillion yen in outstanding loans from FILP, 75 percent went to already insolvent recipients, costing 
taxpayers 75 trillion yen, or 15 percent of GDP at the time.  Imai (Imai, 2009), using prefecture 
level data on Japan’s government loans from 1975 to 1992 shows that prefectures represented by 
more influential LDP members received more governmental loans from the FILP program, and the 
FILP loans increased to prefectures where the ruling LDP candidates became more electorally 
vulnerable, variation that was not observed in loans from private banks.  
To address these problems, in May 2000, a reform bill ended the compulsory deposit of 
postal savings and pension reserves into FILP.  Under the new law, postal savings and insurance 
along with pension funds became independently managed via the financial markets, though they 
continued to invest in FILP bonds and FILP agency bonds issued by public corporations and the 
like, nominally on the basis of portfolio considerations.  FILP, in turn, began to raise funds on an 
as-needed basis by floating FILP bonds on the market.  These reforms severed the direct flow of 
funds between postal savings and politicians via FILP.  Lending under FILP dropped by 63 percent 
during the decade between 1996 and 2006, from 40.5 trillion yen to 15.0 trillion yen.  Today, 
roughly a third of FILP funding still comes from postal savings and insurance. 
In addition to providing politicians with the funds necessary for public investment, a 
nationwide network of post offices and their postmasters provided organizational support for 
politicians.  Japan’s over 24,000 post offices exist in nearly every small town and village.  Among 
them, the more politically salient are the 18,000 “special” post offices headed by commissioned 
postmasters.  Unlike the postmasters of ordinary post offices, these commissioned postmasters were 
hand-picked by postal bureaucrats from among a small group of candidates – often the sons or 
relatives of retiring postmasters -- and in many cases were pre-approved by local LDP Diet 
members (Maclachlan, 2011).  These postmasters in turn served as vote collecting machines and 
also provided logistical and financial support through organizations like the koenkai candidate 
support groups.  In short, the postal lobby has long been seen as a key vote-gathering machine not 
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only by rural LDP politicians but now by the opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and 
the People’s New Party members as well.   
Prior to privatization efforts, the postal system offered postal and package delivery services, 
banking services, and life insurance all under the name of the Postal Services Agency (yusei 
jigyosho).  It had over 400,000 employees and ran 24,700 post offices throughout Japan.  The Postal 
Services Agency was the country’s largest employer, employing one third of all government 
employees.  As a financial institution, the Postal Services Agency’s biggest advantages came from 
their nationwide network and their government ownership.  Postal savings was a low risk, 
convenient option for Japanese households, especially those with lower incomes or living in remote 
areas with few alternative options for investment.  From the viewpoint of financial competitors, 
however, the Postal Services Agency had unfair advantages, creating an uneven playing field and 
hindering competition. 
3.1 Politically Driven Reform 
Postal privatization, like the banking reforms discussed earlier, was a politically driven 
reform effort most closely associated with former Prime Minister Koizumi who successfully passed 
the postal privatization bills in October 2005.  Koizumi was long a proponent of postal privatization, 
beginning in the 1980s when postal privatization was first discussed.  His convictions were rooted 
in his origins in the Mori faction and the LDP’s financial zoku politicians closely affiliated with the 
Ministry of Finance and commercial banks.  He viewed postal privatization as representative of a 
much broader program of market liberalization and structural reform.  His views were supported by 
some bureaucrats, but especially by private banks and firms in the financial sector who saw 
government protection of postal savings and insurance as unfair.   
 Opposition to postal privatization, on the other hand, was fierce.  Rooted in 130 years of 
postal history (postal savings was established in 1875, postal insurance in 1916), the postal lobby 
headed by the postmasters was both the target of reform and the most vociferous opponent.  They 
found support among politicians from both the LDP and opposition parties who benefitted from 
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their political support.  They also found support among some in the public who viewed the old 
postal system as a symbol of Japan’s bygone era of coexisting economic prosperity and social 
harmony.  These citizens equated postal privatization with the evil competitive forces of market 
liberalization and competition, an economic vision that saw little value in the social benefits and 
community services provided by the postal workers.   
Despite resistance from not only the postmasters and the general public, but also from 
within his own party, Koizumi successfully passed postal privatization by utilizing the institutions 
directly under his control.  In particular, he used the Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), 
a policy group largely independent of interest group politics led by Heizo Takenaka to design the 
privatization process.  When opponents in the LDP backed by the postmasters tried to halt the 
policymaking process in the CEFP and in the party more broadly, Koizumi moved the 
policymaking to a small group of allies in the Postal Privatization Promotion Office, effectively 
shielding the process from opponents (Maclachlan, 2012).  Koizumi also took an electoral gamble, 
linking the credibility of his opponents to the passage of the postal privatization bills.  By tying 
postal privatization to his overall stance on reform, Koizumi won a landslide victory in the so-called 
postal elections in September 2005, paving the way for the successful passage of the postal 
privatization bills the following month.   
Koizumi’s overall strategy in passing the privatization bills had important implications for 
their implementation and the ability of the opposition to limit its actual effects.  While Koizumi did 
manage to pass the privatization bills, his strategy was to weaken the opposition by refusing to give 
opposing politicians in the LDP the party endorsement, rather than to strengthen the proponents of 
postal privatization by extolling its benefits and winning greater popular support.  Such a strategy 
ensured the success of the reforms only as long as a strong political maverick like Koizumi 
remained in power.  A close look at the electoral outcome of September 2005 suggests that Koizumi 
and his allies won votes from voters that were against the opposition parties who were unable to 
provide a compelling alternative to postal privatization.  The LDP share of the popular vote 
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increased only marginally over the previous election whereas of the 16 anti-postal privatization 
candidates, 13 still won.  Thus the bill passed but narrowly.  This meant that the opposition to 
postal privatization remained quite strong, leaving the reform vulnerable to future political 
compromises.  The weakness of passing rule changes (the postal privatization bill) despite 
resistance from the very actors they target (postmasters and consumers) is that unless the opposition 
is weakened over time (such as through market forces in the case of private sector finance) the new 
rules can be circumvented, or even reversed, as the trend appears to be so far. 
3.2 Postal Privatization and its Outcomes 
The postal privatization bills themselves left plenty of room for manipulation and 
circumvention by the opponents of the reform, setting the stage for a syncretization of the old 
postal system with the new businesses ushered in by the privatization process.  Koizumi first 
began reform by turning the old Postal Services Agency (Yūsei Jigyōchō) into a government-
owned corporation in 2003 as an intermediary step to outright privatization.  Politically, this was 
an astute strategy, since the postmasters thwarted Koizumi’s efforts to straight up privatize the 
postal savings and insurance systems during his time as Prime Minister Hashimoto’s Minister of 
Health and Welfare.  By the time Koizumi was prime minister in 2003, however, the political 
clout of postmasters had sufficiently weakened and the more reformist politicians within the LDP 
had gained power, allowing the transformation of the state-run postal services into an independent 
government agency called Japan Post (Nippon Yūsei Kōsha).   
While corporatization was an intermediary step, it initiated a number of reforms that 
incentivized Japan Post to think and act more like a corporation than a government agency.  Top 
management of its three divisions, Postal Service, Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance fell in 
the hands of businessmen, mostly former corporate executives rather than the traditional retiring 
bureaucrats.  Profitability became a concern, placing operating pressure on mail services and the 
network of post offices.  Such pressures prompted the innovation of new products such as mutual 
funds and entry into new services like credit cards.  These changes allowed Japan Post to early on 
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taste the benefits of privatization while maintaining a de facto 100 percent government guarantee 
through government ownership, a situation that continues today.   
The October 2005 postal privatization bill paved the way for the privatization of Japan Post 
in October 2007.  The bill split Japan Post into four separate companies: a bank, an insurance 
company, a postal service company, and a company to handle the post offices as retail storefronts of 
the former three.  These four companies came under the control of Japan Post Holdings, which 
under the 2005 bill would sell its shares in the two financial corporations (Japan Post Bank and 
Japan Post Insurance) beginning in fall 2011 and ending in fall 2017.  (See Chart 1) 
[insert Chart 1] 
3.3 Entry into New Businesses 
Privatization gave the companies under Japan Post Holdings the green light to venture 
deeper into new lines of businesses while remaining under the protective umbrella of government 
ownership.  Japan Post Bank now offers postal credit cards with access from the vast postal ATM 
network as well as some ATMs overseas.  Additional services include annuity policies, mortgage 
and consumer loan intermediary services, and sale of funds that invest in Japanese and foreign 
stocks, bonds, real estate investment trusts, and other assets.  Alliances with foreign corporations 
have also opened new business opportunities.  In June 2008, Japan Post Bank and Japan Post 
Network began selling ING Life Japan’s single premium variable annuity (SPVA) products while 
Japan Post Insurance sells ING’s corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) products.  This partnership 
greatly extended ING’s distribution network of banks and securities houses for SPVA products and 
independent agents for COLI products.  In addition to ING Life Japan, a unit of Netherlands-based 
ING, Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Network also started selling variable annuity insurance 
products for Sumitomo Life Insurance, Mitsui Sumitomo MetLife Insurance, and Alico Japan, 
greatly expanding their sales outlets.   
Japan Post Insurance also ventured into new territory in late 2007, offering products to 
corporate customers in partnership with life insurers.  The eight companies working with Japan Post 
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Insurance include ING Life Japan, Axa Life Insurance, American Life Insurance, Sumitomo Life 
Insurance, Tokio Marine & Nichido Life Insurance, Nippon Life Insurance, Mitsui Sumitomo 
Kirameki Life Insurance, and Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance.  They are targeting smaller businesses 
that can utilize these policies as tax-break measures by recording premium payments as losses.  JPI 
continues to push for further expansion of their business.  In 2009, JPI filed an application with the 
Financial Services Agency and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) for 
approval of a new stand-alone insurance product that would compete directly with the private sector 
and foreign companies (ACLI 2012).  In 2010, a cabinet proposal was introduced that would raise 
caps on the amount of insurance coverage and reduce limits on the scope of JPI product offerings.  
The growing voice of protest against such expansions from the private sector and foreign 
companies upset about the statutory, regulatory, and other governmental privileges afforded JPI 
attests to the considerable expansion of JPI.       
3.4 Retrenching to a Hybrid Form  
However, as the economy continued to suffer from deflation and the aftermath of the 2008 
global financial crisis-sparked recession, the public began to side with those opposed to full 
privatization.  Riding this momentum, in November 2009, then DPJ Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama froze the sale of shares in Japan Post’s financial units, a significant retreat from 
Koizumi’s pro-market reforms.  In so doing, Hatoyama tried to appeal to those who saw Koizumi’s 
reforms as excessively market-friendly, a line he touted during his party’s landslide victory earlier 
that year.  At 330 trillion yen ($3.6 trillion) in assets (240 trillion yen in Japan Post Bank), although 
Japan Post Holdings by then accounted for only one fifth of Japan’s total financial assets, down 
from its peak at one third, a significant portion now funded Japanese government bonds.   
The current status of postal privatization is a combination of the old, the new, and the hybrid.  
For Japan Post Bank, the basic business model of taking retail deposits through its nationwide 
network remains intact.  The social services component of the old postal system such as himawari 
or daily visits especially to the elderly have been retained to the greatest extent possible, although a 
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special government fund earmarked for this purpose appears to have evaporated.  Any shares of the 
postal savings and postal insurance companies have yet to leave the hands of the state.  While these 
funds no longer are obligated to invest in FILP, the practice continues with Japan Post holding 
about a third of the 700 trillion yen government bond market.  And while the postal lobby and 
postmasters have continued to lose their political influence, their jobs have been largely retained 
and additional jobs have been created in post-related facilities such as recreation centers and 
lodging.  Ironically, as a result of the passing of the privatization bill, postmasters are no longer 
public servants and are thus free to actively participate in political activities (Maclachlan, 2011).  
The postmasters are by no means as electorally influential as they once were, but they have retained 
enough political influence to win over the DPJ and its supporters. 
In April 2012, a revision to the postal privatization bill passed as a result of an agreement 
between the New Komeito and the LDP. (See Chart 2)  The revision removed the December 2009 
Freeze Law which had halted the sale of government owned shares thereby greatly dampening the 
incentives for privatization (Commission Report March 7, 2012).  However, support for reform in 
the revision ended here.  The revision also removed the requirement for the sale of government 
stakes in the two Japan Post financial institutions (bank and insurance) by September 2017, 
replacing it with a much weaker recommendation their sale.  While Japan Post Holdings President 
Jiro Saito has said that Japan Post aims to go public “at the earliest possible time”, he also said that 
"the shares could end up being handed over to trust banks or acquired by Japan Post Holdings group 
firms."  This, interestingly, is in contrast to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
Minister Kawabata's (DPJ) position stated in Diet deliberations that Japan Post shares should be 
sold publicly. 
[insert Chart 2] 
The revision to the postal privatization bill also stipulated that on October 2012, Japan Post 
Service Company (mail delivery) and Japan Post Network Company (window services) are 
expected to merge.  Proponents of reform see serious pitfalls in this merger, as this raises the risk of 
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systemic shock to Japan’s financial system.  The Commission report by Naoki Tanaka (March 
2012) states that combining these delivery and network business companies with a holding 
company would raise serious doubts about isolating two of the world’s largest financial institutions 
from the holding company’s business risk.  Rising levels of risk aside, however, this merger also 
creates a type of hybrid between a government-owned holding company and a privately held 
corporation.  In regulatory terms, cross-subsidization among subsidiaries of the holding company 
Japan Post is only permitted due to Japan Post’s status as a government owned business; in contrast, 
private holding companies must let subsidiaries go bankrupt.   
At the same time, however, the revision paves the way for greater expansion of Japan Post 
into new business areas.  The revisions do not permit unfettered expansion into areas already 
dominated by the private sector, but the legislation does open the door for new businesses and lower 
the barrier to entry.    
4. Conclusion  
This paper has examined reforms to Japan’s financial system, which lies at the core of its 
model of capitalism. We characterized the observed outcome of its transformation as syncretism, 
the coexistence of traditional, new, and hybrid organizational structures, strategies, and norms. 
Analyzing changes in both the private sector financial system and the postal system, we contend 
that syncretic industry outcomes were driven by a particular pattern of interest group politics, which 
we call syncretization, which in turn drove a distinct pattern of reform. Major thrusts of reform 
occurred when political leadership overwhelmed traditionally powerful vested interests; however, 
when the leadership advocating reform waned, the vested interests substantially slowed further 
reform.  
4.1 Implications for Change in Japan 
Within scholarship of Japan’s transformation since the 1990s (Vogel, 2006; Aoki and 
Jackson and Miyajima, 2007; Schaede, 2008), given the recent developments in postal reform, this 
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study provides one of the first political analyses of both the traditional financial sectors and postal 
financial system. It adds to scholarship revealing how political logic shapes institutional change in 
core sectors.  
There are several implications for Japan’s financial system.  First, we expect Japan’s 
financial system to exhibit syncretism for at least the short to medium term, so far as the traditional 
and hybrid portions, in particular regional banks and mega-banks, remain stable. Japanese 
household savings remains overwhelmingly within domestic deposit institutions, providing them 
with ample sources of capital. While some areas of the system such as securities and investment 
banking are rapidly adopting Anglo-American practices, other areas such as regional banks will 
retain their traditional structures. The growth of hybrid practices and strategies also assures that 
convergence to an Anglo-American model is unlikely any time soon. Questions regarding the 
economic efficiency of this syncretic configuration remains, but the retention of some country 
specific characteristics preserve diversity in the global financial system, and can perhaps serve to 
limit the size of global financial crises that more easily topple similarly designed systems.  For 
Japan, the syncretic nature of financial sector reforms insulated its financial system from the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis.   
Second, the potential integration of Japan’s postal savings and insurance systems into the 
mainstream financial system represents the entry of major new market-based players. Yet given the 
shifting political trajectory with vested interests advocating for a slowdown in reforms returning to 
political prominence, market integration has been substantially slowed.  Japan Post Bank and Japan 
Post Insurance are still wholly held by Japan Post, itself held 100 percent by the Japanese 
government.  In short, the reversals in the privatization process have created government-owned 
firms that directly compete with private firms, both domestic and foreign.  This is another aspect of 
Japan’s financial system that will remain distinct from the US or UK.  But while Japan may take an 
alternate path, these firms as they stand now have the potential of creating new headaches for the 
government as it attempts to steer Japan towards greater participation in both bilateral and regional 
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trade agreements.  In the recent negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership, for example, Japan 
has already met US opposition to plans for state-owned Japan Post Insurance to enter the cancer 
insurance market.  Syncretism may be the outcome of politically led reforms, and may even help 
prevent global domino effects, but when syncretism leads to lack of conformity with liberalization 
trends, this can precipitate isolation and accusations of unfair play.   
4.2 Implications for Understanding Institutional Change 
Finally, let us return to the discussion of how this study fits within the theoretical 
scholarship on institutional change and complementarities. In terms of the typology put forth by 
Streeck and Thelen (Streeck and Thelen, 2005)(2005),29
At a more general level, beyond Japan and beyond finance, this study therefore suggests that 
when analyzing institutional change, different patterns of gradual transformative change may 
themselves be put into motion by political forces that are driven by a separate, often electoral, logic.  
 the pattern of gradual change before the 
abrupt reforms was “conversion,” with old institutions being put to new ends. After the reforms, the 
pattern of change follows that of “layering” in which new elements are attached to existing ones, 
which gradually change their status as the relative size and influence of each shifts over time. The 
growth and competitive success of the new players in Japan’s financial system are creating new 
vested interests, which can affect the interest group political dynamics down the line more 
profoundly than the current period. However, the major reforms themselves do not fit the typology 
of gradual transformative change, as they were rapidly promulgated and implemented, with a 
different logic of change. The contribution of this study is that the rapid reforms, which reshaped 
the course of gradual change from conversion to layering, was driven by a political logic outside the 
pattern of institutional change.  
Finally, this study serves as a concrete application of Aoki (2010)’s more broadly applicable 
framework of institutions, complementarities and change. Put simply and applied to our study, Aoki 
posits that the broader social-level changes that alter the political payoff for initiating economic 
reforms reinforce the outcomes of the reforms themselves, which create greater diversity.  
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Applying this to our study of Japan’s financial sectors, the eroding economic performance 
legitimacy of the financial industry, demise in confidence that the political leadership would return 
the country to growth and indeed stay in power, and loss of faith in the bureaucratic leadership, 
were the quasi-parameter changes. This altered the strategic actions of the political leadership, 
which pursued reform for electoral survival. Bureaucratic actors ceded regulatory power and control 
over the reform process. Industry actors who were previously highly influential in the policy 
process did not mobilize all possible resources to thwart the reforms, since they were unlikely to 
succeed and wanted to avoid further political damage or the future wrath of regulators, particularly 
in the event that they might require bankruptcy protection later on.  
The syncretic industry outcomes of new, traditional, and hybrid can therefore be thought of 
as an equilibrium outcome of these strategic actions among agents, and may be reasonably stable as 
long as the broader political and industry strategies remain compatible. For example, politically, 
reformers could take credit for the high performing new areas and social stability afforded by the 
traditional areas, or conservatives could attack the new inequalities created by the new areas and 
promise to reinforce the traditional elements. In industry, new actors could enjoy their business 
model advantages, while traditional actors continue to receive regulatory protection in the form of 
bail-outs, orchestrated mergers, and designated deposit institutions.  
The equilibrium is not necessarily stable for the long run, however, since societal quasi-
parameters could change. For example, the perception of legitimacy of either the new or traditional 
elements could erode precipitously if a performance shock hit either one disproportionately. Or one 
could image if social inequity rose steadily while the new portions of finance saw skyrocketing 
executive compensation during a downturn in which retail investors lost money, public perceptions 
could shift against new finance. This would in turn affect the political strategies of reformers 
spearheading greater regulation on the industry.  
Put simply, by applying the Aoki (2010) framework, we see that syncretic industry 
outcomes and syncretization as a political process can be thought of as specific equilibria outcomes 
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among multiple possibilities. This is not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, nor is it necessarily 
transitory. It shows how the co-evolution of industry and regulatory/political structure as the 
product of multiple strategic games is a possible alternative to conceptions of rigid institutional 
complementarities that would otherwise preclude partial moves away from traditional models 
without a systemic shock.  Concrete examples include the prolonged coexistence of multiple forms 
of employment, corporate organization, and strategies within the same industry.  
Will competition in the marketplace simply drive out the traditional in favor of the new and 
hybrid? Here, we must remember that the factors retaining the viability of the traditional elements 
(in this case regional banks and the postal bank), depend on policy factors beyond simple market 
competition based on economic efficiency. Until the political conditions stemming from electoral 
pressures shift to abolish these factors (such as the designated financial institution system or postal 
bank being too large to fail), then we can expect them to remain in the short-medium term.  
In more general terms, beyond finance and beyond Japan, our study therefore provides an 
empirical grounding for the types of interactions and strategies to look for when understanding 
change in diversely organized capitalist systems around the world. As industries worldwide become 
more diverse, with previously distinct sectoral boundaries breaking down and the pervasive spread 
of information technology-enabled services transforming corporate activity (Zysman et al., 2013), 
syncretic industry patterns are likely to become more common. To understand how these patterns 
come about, and to assess their trajectories of change, we posit that gradual transformative change 
can be punctuated by political re-bargaining, which can shift the type of change from one pattern to 
another. We also posit that the change itself—the co-evolution of industrial diversity and political 
economic transformation—can be a stable outcome of strategic games played at the corporate and 
societal levels. These are important building blocks towards an understanding of what Aoki calls 
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1 For an excellent overview of the “comparative capitalisms” literature, see (Jackson and Deeg, 
2008). 
2 For an overview, see (Morgan et al., 2010), particularly chapters by Thelen, Campbell, Streeck, 
and Jackson. 
3 See, in particular, the seminal work (Zysman, 1983). 
4 Crouch (2010) reminds us that scholars tend to evaluate institutions in terms of their relative 
success, but are ambiguous in their definitions. Avoiding the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 is 
one short term indication.  
5 Kushida first applied this concept to Japan’s transforming political economy. (Kushida, 2010) 
6 Aoki and collaborators empirically show Japanese firms clustering around several corporate 
forms: the traditional J-firm model (with at least three subcategories), and multiple subtypes of two 
hybrid models (Aoki et al., 2007; Aoki, 2010). Our conception of syncretism is simpler, to more 
easily capture the dynamics of change.  




                                                                                                                                                                  
8 For an overview of the varying conceptions of institutional complementarities, see (Crouch, 
2010). 
9 (Hall and Gingerich, 2009) contend that change in one institution without changes in the 
complementary institutions lead to inferior economic outcomes.  
10 By the 1970s, an astonishing 90 plus percent of the population was estimated to have life 
insurance policies, much of it in the form of “group insurance” offered via employers (Okamoto, 
2006).  
11 For the “convoy system” see (Aoki, 1988). As Vogel writes, “Unlike their counterparts in the 
United States, Japanese financial institutions rarely tested the rules without the blessing of the 
authorities.” (Vogel, 1994, p. 225) 
12 Notable conceptions include “Bureaupluralism” (Aoki, 1988), compartmentalized pluralism (Sato 
and Matsuzaki, 1986), bureaucratic-inclusive pluralism (Inoguchi, 1983), reciprocal consent 
(Samuels, 1987). 
13 Vogel (1994) writes, “While MoF officials have been forced to make concessions to industry 
groups and to adjust to unforeseen developments along the way, they have maintained overall 
control of the reform process.”  
14 For details, see (Toya, 2006) 
15 For an overview of these arguments, (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010). 
16 They were free to invest into real estate even after MOF’s banking bureau issued administrative 
guidance to curb such lending from banks. Major banks therefore used these housing loan 
companies to bypass the regulation. (Toya, 2006, p. 115) 
17 Quoted in (Toya, 2006, p. 171) 
18 In 1997 the public prosecutor’s office investigated Nomura Securities, Daiichi Kangyo Bank and 
others, leading to arrests and MOF sanctions. 
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19 It should be clarified that Thelen and Streeck, and Mahoney and Thelen’s conceptions of 
institutional change are limited to gradual transformative change, and do not include the type of 
rapid and sweeping changes constituting the Big Bang reforms.  
20 For an empirical study of foreign stock brokerages, see (Morgan and Kubo, 2005). 
21 This was according to a 2001 survey conducted by the Japan Securities Dealers Association 
polling Japan’s 200 largest brokerages (2001). 
22 For details, see (Kushida, 2010) 
23 Cerulli Associates calculations based on data from the Investment Trusts Association, the JSDA, 
the Japan Securities Investment Advisers Associations, and other sources.  
24 For more, see (Kushida, 2010). 
25  For more on the role of SMEs in the labor market and their relationship to regional banks, see 
(Shimizu, 2013). 
 
26 Smaller SMEs tend to have shorter relationships with their banks, but this is more often due 
shorter lifespans of small SMEs. See the SME White Paper graph on the average length of SME-
main bank relationships Figure 2-3-10 (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, 2003).  
27 For more on FILP, see (Park, 2011) 
28 In 1997, deposits in private banks and the postal savings system were 474,629 billion yen and 
237,782 billion yen, respectively.  At the start of the privatization process in 2007, these amounts 
had shifted to 545,043 billion yen and 180,843 billion yen, respectively (Yoshino, 2008).  
29 Their typology includes displacement (the slowing rising salience of subordinate institutions 
relative to dominant ones), layering, (described in text), drift (neglect of institutions leading to 
slippage in practice on the ground), conversion (described in text), and exhaustion (a gradual 
withering away of institutions over time).  
 
Table 1: Total Deposits and Assets of City Banks, Regional Banks, and Postal Savings 
(trillions yen) 
 
Source: BOJ. “Deposits and Loans Markets.” 





Date City Banks Regional Banks Postal Savings* 
Deposits    
1995 209.0 217.7 - 
2000 230.6 235.0 - 
2005 255.7 245.9 200.0 
2010 270.3 272.6 175.8 
Assets 
1995 346.9 194.7 - 
2000 373.0 200.5 - 
2005 395.5 216.7 194.7 
2010 419.4 240.1 264.9 
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Table 2: Japan’s Financial Groups and Postal Bank Compared (Trillions yen) 
 
 
Source: Kaisha Shikiho 2005 Summer, Company Financial Reports 
 2005   2010  
 Deposits Total Assets  Deposits Total Assets 
Japan Post 200.0 247.7  Japan Post 175.8 194.7 
Mitsui Sumitomo 
Finanacial Group 





























Resona Holdings 33.0 40.0     
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Chart 1.  The 2005 Postal Privatization Bill 
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Chart 2.  The April 2012 Revision to the Postal Privatization Bill 
 
Source:  The Nikkei, May 13, 2012 morning edition 
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